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Abstract This paper presents an improvement to the well-
known protocol by David Chaum for anonymous currency
exchange. We show its vulnerability to serious frauds by both
the client and the seller, after an electronic coin is spent at
least twice. In this case, the system cannot successfully deter-
mine how many times the client spent the coin and how many
times the seller faked the transaction. Therefore, the bank is
not able to charge the real abuser. This limitation leads to the
conclusion that the original system cannot be securely used
for irreversible off-line transactions. In this paper, we show
the gist of the problem and propose an improved system based
on its original off-line version that allows this vulnerability
to be overcome.
Keywords Electronic cash · Anonymous transaction ·
Protocols for exchanging electronic coins
1 Introduction
Today, regardless of the existence of very well developed
online banking and payment card infrastructure, there is no
way to completely freely send cash in a way guaranteeing
one’s anonymity. This means that no electronic transaction
can be made in secret, as is frequently done when regular
cash is used. However, for many reasons, the exchange of
regular cash is not a convenient method, so a way of anony-
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mously transferring cash over the Internet would be very
useful. There are at least two ways in which such a system
can be built. One of them is to create a virtual currency (Hao
et al. 2005). Bitcoins are an example of such a system (Bit-
coin 2014). The second way is to create an electronic cash
system. In this solution, a bank mediates the transfer of cash,
but the customers only exchange anonymous cheques of a
specified value. Creating such a protocol is far from trivial,
also due to the ease with which electronically stored data can
be copied.
It should be noted that the first method that enabled
cheques to be anonymously exchanged is David Chaum’s
protocol described in paper (Chaum et al. 1990). Even though
it was developed more than 20 years ago and has been
improved and modified many times, it has so far been the
basic solution and a large proportion of protocols developed
later were founded on it (Brands 1994, 1995; Deng et al.
1997; Ferguson 1994; Kim et al. 2002; Menezes et al. 1996).
The main subject of this publication is to present an attack on
David Chaum’s protocol and propose a modification which
would allow fraud attempts in this protocol to be eliminated.
Firstly, this study will characterise the features of electronic
cash exchange systems, next describe the operating mech-
anism of the basic version of David Chaum’s protocol fol-
lowed by analysis of its vulnerabilities and then show the
authors’ proposal for enhancing this protocol in a way which
prohibits the client or the sellers from committing fraud dur-
ing multiple offline transactions.
2 Properties of systems processing anonymous
transactions
In an electronic cash exchange system, the payment occurs
in three stages.
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At the first stage, the client contacts the bank and down-
loads an electronic cheque. Then, the client contacts the seller
and spends the cheque downloaded from the bank at the
seller’s. At the third stage, the seller contacts the bank and
presents it with a certificate of concluding a transaction with
the client, in return for which it receives its monetary equiv-
alent.
Such an electronic cash exchange system assumes that
the three parties involved in it, i.e., the bank, the client and
the seller, are completely independent of one another. Thus,
the system must guarantee to each party that it will not be
cheated, even if the other two parties are acting in bad faith
and in collusion. In addition, every one of the three stages,
i.e. the creation, spending and cashing of the notes can be
executed separately. Hence, every one of these stages requires
a different special protocol. The notes held by the client after
it finishes communicating with the bank are called electronic
cash due to their guaranteed anonymity, just as paper cash is
anonymous. After it is spent at the second stage, the seller
holds certificates of the transaction which it presents to the
bank any time after finishing its communications with the
client.
If transaction protocols are executed like this, the main
problem is that the bank must not be able to associate the
transaction certificates presented to it by the seller with the
cheque which it had issued to the client.
The key requirement for all electronic money systems is
that they must operate securely. This applies to the clients, the
sellers and the bank itself. The absolute condition is that every
party must have a guarantee that it will not be cheated and
that this guarantee is not based only on confidence in other
participants of the system. Such requirements apply to all
systems and their implementations, regardless of other prop-
erties which generally boil down to functionality enhance-
ments. In this case, security is mainly understood as the lack
of ability to steal funds from other system users, but it also
represents the guarantee that other properties will be main-
tained, such as the transaction anonymity.
The main features of electronic cash transfer systems are
as follows:
• Anonymity—the system must guarantee that the bank
cannot trace the transactions. Some systems support the
use of a single high denomination banknote at many sell-
ers’, by transferring only a certain part of this banknote
corresponding to the value of the transaction to each
seller. However, for such systems, a frequent problem
should be noted that the bank could link all the transac-
tions in which fragments of one banknote were used.
• Transaction processing may occur when the banknotes
are spent, or may take place later. Systems in which sell-
ers must cash banknotes when they receive them from
clients work online. By analogy, systems in which execut-
ing the transaction does not require contacting the bank
execute payments off-line. As a rule, they are harder to
implement and require additional mechanisms prevent-
ing banknotes from being copied. Eliminating the need to
stay in constant touch with the bank makes the entire sys-
tem more complex, usually posing a significant burden
on its capacity. At the same time, the possibility to make
the transactions off-line is a very desirable property.
• Transaction reversibility. If a seller is able to reverse a
transaction and incur no cost or loss, such transactions are
referred to as ‘soft’. Conversely, if transactions are irre-
versible, they are called ‘hard’. When the seller concludes
a hard transaction, it must be certain that it will receive
the payment for it. This problem is to some extent con-
nected with the previous criterion. Any soft online system
can be turned into a soft off-line one. If a banknote is not
processed correctly, it is enough to reverse the transac-
tion. However, it should be noted that supporting only
soft transactions significantly limits the functionality of
the system.
• System requirements concerning access to data. There
are systems, such as those described in Brands (1994),
which require the users to hold banknotes stored only on
specially secured tamper-proof cards. Such a card stores
data about banknotes but does not allow unauthorised per-
sons to read it. It only allows transactions to be executed
in a way the card supervises. The majority of data stored
on it is used exclusively for executing the calculations
(e.g., executing digital signatures) but is never directly
read. The use of this technology simplifies the majority
of operations greatly, but introduces many restrictions
on the use of the system. An additional drawback is the
fact that system security is based on purely mechanical
security measures preventing cards from being read.
In the light of the above properties, one can see that the most
functional system would be one that would support conclud-
ing anonymous, hard off-line transactions without using spe-
cial tamper-proof devices. However, the problem of banknote
copying arises under these assumptions. This is because there
is nothing to stop the client from duplicating the banknotes
it holds and using them several times in various transactions.
The seller would then be unable to protect itself from receiv-
ing, in several instances, a banknote that has already been
used, because the assumption of this system is that there is
no need to verify banknotes immediately. Another condition
is that transactions must be irreversible. If these two assump-
tions exist in parallel, the seller is powerless facing dishonest
users who duplicate banknotes. To take away the client’s
ability to commit such fraud, a way is needed of detecting
dishonest users after the transaction has been made. This
necessitates storing some information about the holder in the
banknote. However, we do not want this information to be
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readable when the user is behaving honestly. Lower down,
we present a system based on this approach.
3 Basic Chaum’s protocol for electronic cash exchange
The first and best known method of implementing an elec-
tronic cash system that meets all the assumptions presented
above was firstly outlined in Chaum (1983) and then pro-
posed in Chaum et al. (1990) by David Chaum. This scheme
has become the reference example for implementing an elec-
tronic cash exchange, presented, e.g., in Goldwasser and
Bellare (2008), Menezes et al. (1996), Schneier (1996) and
Schneier (2004). In this solution, the banknote is composed
of a signed n element sequence of pairs Pi (i ∈ 1, 2, . . . n)
having the following structure:
Pi = (h(ai , ci ), h(ai ⊕ u, di ))
where u is a unique client ID also known to the bank, ai is
a number randomly selected by the client to hide the value
of u, ci , di are a numbers randomly selected by the client to
create the hash function with a password.
The number n is a certain constant of the system and deter-
mines its security (at the cost of its possible efficiency). To
obtain such an electronic banknote, the client communicates
with the bank using the following protocol:
1. The client randomly chooses 2 ∗ n pairs Pi and their
corresponding obfuscating coefficients ri .
2. The client sends all the obfuscated hashes of pairs rei ∗
h(Pi ) to the bank (the number e is the public part of the
bank’s key).
3. The bank selects n of the pairs sent and asks the client to
send their corresponding values of ri , ai , ci and di .
4. The client sends the requested numbers to the bank.
5. The bank checks if they comply with the obfuscated
hashes sent before.
6. The bank signs all the remaining pairs, multiplies them
one by the other and sends them back to the client. It also
debits the value of the banknote to the client’s account
balance.
7. The client receives the signed pairs and then removes the
obfuscation from them.
At step 6, the client receives the product of multiplying the
signatures of all selected pairs:
I =
∏
(rei ∗ h(Pi ))dmod n, i ∈ L
where e is a the public exponent of the bank key, d is a the
private exponent of the bank key, n is a the bank signature
module, L is a set of indexes of banknotes selected for sign-
ing by the bank. The value I from above formula contain
obfuscated all remaining pairs signed by bank private key.
This value allows further to reveal the signed banknote by
dividing this value by subsequent obfuscating factors ri . In
such a way, the client obtains the signed banknote, which is
represented by following formula:
Z = I ∗
∏
r−1i mod n, i ∈ L ,
where I is the product of multiplied obfuscated signatures, ri
is a obfuscating coefficients, n is a the bank signature module,
L is a set of indexes of banknotes selected for signing by the




h(Pi )dmod n, i ∈ L
At this stage, the client holds a signed banknote composed
of n pairs Pi and the signature Z certifying these pairs. In
addition, all the values of coefficients ai , bi , ci and di must
be stored.
At the next stage, to make the payment, the client presents
all pairs Pi and the bank’s signature Z associated with them to
the seller. The seller, having checked the regularity of the ban-
knote and its compliance with the signatures, creates the so-
called challenge Y. This is an n-long sequence of zeroes and
ones, of which some are constant and assigned to the seller,
and some are randomly chosen. The seller then sends them
to the client. For every respective element of this sequence,
the client returns the following to the seller:
A. The values ai and ci —if the i th element of the sequence
Y is 0
B. The values ai ⊕ u and di —if the i th element of the
sequence Y is 1
The client’s response to the challenge is illustrated in Fig. 1.
On a current basis, the seller checks the compliance of the
values sent with their hashes previously sent by the client in
the form of pairs Pi . If everything is correct, the payment is
accepted.
At this stage, the seller holds a sequence of pairs Pi , their
corresponding signature Z , and for each Pi pair also the val-
ues (ai , ci ) or (ai ⊕ u, di ). This data will be referred to
as the transaction certificate. To cash the received certifi-
cate, the seller contacts the bank and provides it with all
the data received from the client as well as the challenge
Y generated during the sale. The bank checks the regularity
of the banknote, the digital signature and also whether the
values (ai , ci ) as well as (ai ⊕ u, di ) correspond to their
hashed values in Pi . If any of these values is incorrect, the
fault is on the seller’s part, as it was able to independently
check the regularity of the banknote when the client was
making the payment. If the banknote is correct, the bank
checks its database to see whether the same banknote had
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Fig. 1 Client’s response to the challenge of the seller
not been used before. If it has not, the bank credits the appro-
priate, previously established amount to the seller’s account.
However, if the same banknote is already kept in the data-
base, the bank tries to establish who is at fault in this situa-
tion.
The seller is able to copy the transaction certificate, but
all copies will only be correct for one challenge Y. This is
randomly chosen in each transaction and the seller receives a
different certificate every time. Thus if it presents two identi-
cal certificates, it can be said with a high likelihood that it is
the seller who is trying to commit a fraud. If the certificates
differ, this means that it was the client who used the same
banknote twice in different transactions.
If the banknote had been used twice, it is highly likely that
two challenges randomly chosen in these processes—Y1 and
Y2, respectively—differ by at least one element. If so, then
there is at least one pair Px for which we know the value
of both ax and ax ⊕ u. Thus, the bank is able to calculate
the value u, which is the unique ID of the client. However,
this ID cannot be ascertained if the client had paid only once
with this banknote. Then the bank always has only either ai
or ax ⊕u available to it. The value ai contains no information
identifying the client. Neither does the value ax ⊕ u contain
any information, because if we assume that ai is completely
random, this number also becomes completely random.
In publication (Chaum et al. 1990), David Chaum men-
tions the possibility of introducing an additional modification
to the protocol that would enable the bank to prove that the
client has used the same banknote more than once. In the
scheme shown above, the bank is able to generate any cer-
tificate on behalf of the client but without its knowledge and
permission. The easiest way of stripping the bank of this
ability is to force the client to sign the banknotes it receives.
The bank will then be unable to create a banknote without
the client’s involvement, so once the identity of the cheating
client is ascertained, this fraud can be proven.
To support this functionality, the unique customer ID u is
replaced with an additional number zi randomly selected by
the client. The banknote is then composed of n pairs Pi of
the following form:
Pi = (h(ai , ci ), h(ai ⊕ (u ‖ zi ), di ))
where the operator ‖ represents such a combination of the
numbers that each one can be read separately (e.g., by writing
two numbers of a specified bit length one next to the other).
The process of spending the banknote will then addition-
ally start with the client sending the signed list of abbre-
viations of all numbers zi . The bank will thus receive the
following number:
Z = h(z1), h(z2), . . . , h(zn)
and the signature: CK (Z). At the next stage, the client sends
the obfuscated banknotes as such. The bank chooses half
of them and checks if they are correctly structured. It then
receives the appropriate numbers zi from the client as well.
After the banknote has been spent, the bank holds half of the
zi liabilities and the hashes of all these liabilities including the
signed ones. If the client uses a banknote more than once, not
only will the client’s identity be revealed, but so will at least
one new zi coefficient. If the bank presents more than exactly
half of the signed liabilities zi , this is considered to prove that
the client has used a banknote several times, because the bank
cannot independently prepare such liabilities.
4 Properties and limitations of David Chaum’s system
The basic properties of the presented system are as follows:
1. A transaction can be concluded without the need to con-
tact the bank at the time of its conclusion.
2. No need to use any special tamper-proof devices or cards.
3. Transactions are anonymous if the client is behaving hon-
estly.
4. The security of every party is guaranteed even if the
remaining two parties are acting in collusion against it.
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Apart from these properties, certain risks to the parties
using this system may also arise. The main ones are: the
same banknote being spent many times, counterfeit ban-
knotes being made and the loss of the client’s anonymity.
Let us then consider a case in which the client tries to
spend a banknote several times. In this case, the risk to the
bank and the seller depends greatly on the strategy of action
chosen. There are at least two different options:
A. In exchange for every banknote correctly presented by
the seller, the bank pays money out, even if the client
has spent this banknote several times. The client is then
obliged to pay for all transactions concluded.
B. If it is detected that a banknote has been used several
times, no funds are credited to the seller’s account. The
seller is only given the personal data of the dishonest
client. It is then the seller who must reverse the transaction
and possibly claim damages.
Adopting strategy B makes the system a soft one, so all
the risk rests with the seller. If the seller incurs any costs
of the transaction, it must charge them to the client itself.
The limitations resulting from selecting strategy B are a rea-
son to adopt strategy A. This solution implies that the bank
is responsible for prosecuting dishonest clients. However,
it is difficult to claim the amount due from clients. One
can imagine a situation in which a person with an aver-
age income spends one banknote worth one dollar one mil-
lion times. The bank has to pay a million dollars to sell-
ers. However, it stands no realistic chance to recover this
amount due from the client. Another problem is banknote
theft. The thief can spend the stolen banknotes many times,
each time charging the account of the client it has stolen them
from.
Consequently, strategy A gives rise to a greater risk of
the bank and the client. Under the B strategy, the risk is
mainly borne by the seller. True enough, strategy B restricts
the functionality. If a system fulfils all the conditions for
strategy A to be adopted, it can also operate according to
strategy B. In the opposite case, it is necessary to introduce
a mechanism for proving the sale.
Let us thus consider whether the presented system is ready
to operate correctly under the A strategy. Let us consider the
following scenario. A client, intending to commit a fraud,
spends a banknote exactly twice. The injured sellers can now
secretly exchange the information received. Assuming that
their challenges Y1 and Y2 differ in m bits, they can jointly
generate as many as 2m different combinations of transaction
certificates. It is enough that they combine a part of one cer-
tificate with a part of the other. A new transaction certificate
is thus produced. In this situation, the sellers have certificates
of transactions which have never taken place. They can then
approach the bank claiming that they have been cheated many
times and the bank cannot establish how many times it was
really the client cheating, and how many times the sellers. The
bank cannot establish what amount the client has really spent,
and therefore cannot demand compensation from the client.
This situation makes the bank unable to accept the strategy of
guaranteed disbursements in this system. The bank is forced
to guarantee only to reveal the identity of dishonest clients. In
the majority of frauds, it will probably be possible to charge
double the amount of the transaction to the client, but it must
be emphasised that if this method is the only one used, this
can never be guaranteed. Hence the seller cannot rely on the
regularity of the banknote itself until it cashes it with the
bank.
The above example thus shows that Chaum’s system is
only capable of executing fully reversible transactions with-
out a guarantee that damages will be received if a fraud is
committed.
5 A proposed enhancement to the protocol supporting
multiple transaction detection
To enhance Chaum’s system so that irreversible off-line
transactions can be concluded, it is necessary to introduce the
ability to prove all transactions concluded. This will make it
possible to claim compensation if the same banknote is spent
more than once.
To this end, it is necessary to change the certificates issued
by the clients in such a way that sellers cannot generate new
ones based on any number of those already held.
We therefore propose a modification of the protocol in
which clients sign all the challenges received from sellers and
send them together with certificates. However, if they used
their own key for signing, they would cease to be anonymous.
It is therefore necessary to apply a one-time key which should
be tied to the real key of the client somehow. One of the
possible ways is to attach it to the banknote together with its
certificate signed by the client (the structure of the banknote
is presented in Fig. 2). Instead of pairs Pi , the client then
sends triplets:
Ti = (h(ai , ci ), h(ai ⊕ (u ‖ C(Ki )), di ), Ki )
where ai , ci , di is a random numbers chosen by the client, u
is the unique ID of the client, Ki− is a public part of a one-
time RSA key generated by the client. This can be written,
e.g., as (e ‖ n), where e is the public exponent of this key,
while n is its module, C is the client’s certificate employed
to sign all Ki keys. This can be, e.g., the number h(K )d
mod m, where the numbers (d, m) constitute the private part
of the RSA key published by the client (the so-called main
key).
Before starting to create banknotes, the clients must reg-
ister their main public keys with the bank (Mao et al. 1996).
It is best if clients use keys certified by a certain certification
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Fig. 2 Modified digital note
authority. The keys are registered only once for each client,
at the time its account is created.
The protocol of creating the banknote, in which the bank
and the client are involved, is similar as in the previous ver-
sion. The difference is the banknote itself, which consists of
n triplets Ti , and not pairs Pi as in the previous case. The
client sends the bank 2*n obfuscated banknotes, from which
the bank chooses one half and asks the client to remove the
obfuscation from them. Having received all the necessary
coefficients, the bank checks the regularity of the banknotes
just as before. In addition, it must assure itself that all certifi-
cates C(Ki ) contained in the sent banknotes are the correct
certificates of keys Ki , i.e. they apply to the key Ki contained
in the subsequent part of the banknote and they have been
signed with the client’s main key (which the bank holds in
its database). If everything is correct, then the bank sends the
signed banknote to the client just as in the previous version
of the protocol. Thus the client, having removed the obfus-




h(Ti )d mod n, i ∈ L
where d is the private exponent of the bank key, n is the bank
signature module, L is a set of indexes of banknotes selected
for signing by the bank. The idea of this entire improve-
ment is that every transaction executed by the client should
leave a unique trace that cannot be faked. To obtain this func-
tionality of the protocol, the client signs the challenge sent
to it by the seller using the Ki keys contained in the ban-
knotes. The protocol for the banknote exchange between the
client and the seller (presented in Fig. 3) thus looks as fol-
lows:
1. The client sends the banknote Z signed by the bank.
2. The client also sends the Ti triplets (i.e., the values
h(ai , ci ), h(ai ⊕ (u ‖ C(Ki )), di ) and Ki ).
3. The seller checks whether banknote Z is the correct sig-
nature of the signed triplets.
4. The seller sends the challenge Y to the client.
5. The client provides the seller with the value of the chal-
lenge Y signed with all one-time keys Ki :
R = K1(K2(. . . Kn(Y ) . . .))
where Ki (x) is the signature of the value x with the use of
the key Ki .
6. The seller verifies the validity of the signature R.
7. The client provides the seller, respectively, with the val-
ues (ai , ci ) or (ai ⊕ (u ‖ C(Ki )), di ) depending on the
value of the i th bit of challenge Y (just as in the previous
version of the protocol).
8. The seller checks whether the data sent corresponds to the
hashes contained in triplets Ti . If everything is correct,
the payment is accepted.
To cash the banknote, at whatever moment, the seller
presents the bank with the signed banknote Z , the sequence
of triplets Ti , the generated challenge Y together with the
signature R and all the values dependent on this challenge
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Fig. 3 Customer response to the challenge of the seller in the protocol proposed by the authors
sent by the client. The bank is able to check the regularity
of all data in the same way as the seller was able to when it
exchanged the banknote with the client.
Just as in the standard version of the protocol, after spend-
ing the banknote once, the client reveals only one half of each
liability. At the same time, if the same banknote has been
spent at least twice, the bank is highly likely to possess two
complementary halves, but thanks to the modification it will
learn not only the client’s identity, but also at least one of the
certificates C(Ki ).
Thus, the bank becomes able to prove to the client that it
has spent a banknote more than once. This is because every
transaction is signed by the client with all keys Ki . At the
time of the fraud, the bank not only knows the identity of the
client, but also holds at least one set containing the liability
signed with a certain one-time key and the client’s certificate
authenticating this key. If the bank is able to provide the client
with the signature R of a given challenge Y and to prove to
it that the signature belongs to the client, this transaction can
be considered proven. This is because no one other than the
client can create the certificate for the key Ki used to sign
the challenge. Neither can anyone fake this signature as the
banknote only contains the public part of it.
If the client spends banknotes only once, then it is impos-
sible to learn either its ID u, or any of the certificates C(Ki ).
This certificate, together with the key Ki , could also be used
to identify the client. It is enough that the bank tries to ver-
ify this certificate using all main keys of clients it holds in
its database. One of them would probably be correct. This
could be the basis for discovering the identity of the client,
so certificates must also be kept secret until a fraud occurs.
What is, however, overt is the key Ki itself. It is created ran-
domly by the client and contains no information that could
identify it.
After this solution is implemented, the bank is able to
prove exactly how much the client has spent. Consequently
(assuming that it is able to recover this receivable from the
client by way of effective collection), it can adopt the strategy
of paying funds to all sellers who present correct transaction
certificates. Thus, the system makes off-line transaction con-
clusion possible.
What still remains is the problem of banknote theft. If
a banknote ends up in the hands of an unauthorised per-
son, it can be used to overdraw the owner’s account with-
out any limitation. To prevent this, once the client learns of
the theft, it can report it to the bank so that the latter pub-
lishes a list of void banknotes. In addition, the bank itself,
once it detects a double payment, can publicly report this
banknote as stolen. On the other hand, if we assume that
transactions are concluded without contacting the bank, we
can never eliminate this problem completely. However, the
same difficulty arises in the digital signature scheme itself.
The problem can be eliminated if, every time before we start
receiving a digital signature, we refer to a public database to
check if the signature has not been stolen. However, if we
decide to build a system that accepts signatures off-line—
without contacting a public database of stolen signatures—
we can never be certain that the signature has not been
stolen.
If the risk of theft is considered to be too high, it is always
possible to fall back on the strategy of concluding only irre-
versible transactions. Apart from capacity issues, the pro-
posed modification does not weaken the original system in
any way.
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6 Summary
The system presented by David Chaum in Chaum et al.
(1990) is the first system capable of processing anonymous
transactions off-line and represented a ground-breaking dis-
covery in the field of anonymous electronic payments. How-
ever, if the same banknote is spent at least twice by the client,
the system becomes susceptible to attacks both by cheated
sellers and the client itself. This weakness means it cannot
be used to conclude irreversible transactions. The same prob-
lem also applies to other systems based on a similar protocol.
The introduction of the modification proposed by the authors
allows such attacks to be prevented and makes it possible to
conclude hard transactions as well.
At present there is no widely used electronic cash sys-
tem based on the electronic cheque scheme, but there are no
obstacles to building one (Ma et al. 2011). What is necessary
is a certain surcharge of calculations for every transaction as
well as the suitably greater storage resources which will allow
data about used up banknotes to be stored for a long time.
Solutions described in publication (Ferguson 1994) allow the
necessary resources to be significantly reduced.
It seems that, sooner or later, electronic cash technology
will gain in popularity and will start replacing traditional
credit cards and bank transfers (Hao et al. 2005). This is
very probable, as otherwise the banks would obtain huge
amounts of confidential information about their customers.
However, maintaining secrecy is crucial for the security and
development of many companies, which will therefore be
happy to use this new solution to mitigate the risk of losing
data or intrusion detection (Leu et al. 2010; Ogiela and Ogiela
2012a, b, 2014).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
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reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the
source are credited.
References
Bitcoin (2014) Website of Bitcoin foundation developing virtual cur-
rency with the same name. http://bitcoin.org. Accessed 15 May 2014
Brands S (1994) Untraceable off-line cash in wallets with observers. In:
Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference
on advances in cryptology, CRYPTO ’93, pp 302–318, Springer-
Verlag, New York
Brands S (1995) Off-line electronic cash based on secret-key certifi-
cates. In: Lecture notes in computer science, vol 911, pp 131–166.
Springer-Verlag, New York
Chaum D (1983) Blind signatures for untraceable payments advances
in cryptology. In: Proceedings of Crypto 82, pp 199–203. Springer-
Verlag, New York
Chaum D, Fiat A, Naor M (1990) Untraceable electronic cash. In: Pro-
ceedings on advances in cryptology, CRYPTO ’88, pp 319–327.
Springer-Verlag, New York
Deng RH, Han Y, Jeng AB, Ngair T (1997) A new on-line cash check
scheme. In: Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on computer
and communications security, pp 111–116. ACM, London
Ferguson N (1994) Single term off-line coins. In: Workshop on the
theory and application of cryptographic techniques on advances
in cryptology, EUROCRYPT ’93, pp 318–328. Springer-Verlag,
New York
Goldwasser S, Bellare M (2008) Lecture notes on cryptography. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge
Hao YY, Havey DM, Tumer DA (2005) An exchange protocol for
alternative currencies. In: International conference on information
technology—coding and computing location, vol 1, pp 420–424.
IEEE Computer Society, Las Vegas, 04–06 April 2005
Kim S, Oh H (2002) A new electronic check system with reusable
refunds. Int J Inf Secur 1/3:175–188 (Springer-Verlag)
Leu F-Y, Yang C-T, Jiang F-C (2010) Improving reliability of a het-
erogeneous grid-based intrusion detection platform using levels of
redundancies. Future Gener Comput Syst 26(4):554–568
Ma W-M, Wang Ke, Liu Z-P (2011) Mining potentially more inter-
esting association rules with fuzzy interest measure. Soft Comput
15(6):1173–1182
Mao W (1996) Blind certification of public keys and off-line electronic
cash. Hawlett-Packard Laboratories, Palo Alto
Menezes AJ, van Oorschot P C, Vanstone SA (1996) Handbook of
applied cryptography. CRC Press, London
Ogiela MR, Ogiela U (2012) Linguistic protocols for secure information
management and sharing. Comput Math Appl 63(2):564–572
Ogiela MR, Ogiela U (2012) DNA-like linguistic secret sharing for
strategic information systems. Int J Inf Manag 32(2):175–181
Ogiela MR, Ogiela U (2014) Secure information management using
linguistic threshold approach. Adv Inf Knowl Process. doi:10.1007/
978-1-4471-5016-9 (ISSN 1610-3947, ISBN 978-1-4471-5015-2,
Springer-Verlag, London)
Schneier B (1996) Applied cryptography: protocols, algorithms, and
source code in C. Wiley, London
Schneier B (2004) Secrets and lies: digital security in a networked world.
Wiley, New York
123
